

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Impact Framing

Extinction from nuclear war dwarfs all other impact calculus – reducing nuclear risk is morally required

Jonathan **Schell, 2000**, *Fate of the Earth*, pp. 93-96, Jonathan Schell was an American author and was a fellow at the Institute of Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and a fellow at the Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. In 2003, he was a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School, and in 2005, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Yale's Center for the Study of Globalization, whose work primarily dealt with campaigning against nuclear weapons, https://books.google.com/books?id=tYKJsAEs1oQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=jonathan+schell+fate+of+the+earth&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewj2p6fzmbXOAhXJCMaKHZsID_QQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=to%20say%20that%20human%20extinction&f=false

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of "the basic power of the universe" – and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should

inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.

International Law Advantage - SCS

Impact

Creating peace and conditions for harmony is a moral obligation

Gerard F. **Powers & Drew Christiansen, 1994**, Peacemaking: Moral and Policy Challenges for a New World, United States Catholic Conference, Georgetown University Press, pages 45-46, Gerard Powers is professor of the practice of Catholic peacebuilding at the Kroc Institute. He also coordinates the Catholic Peacebuilding Network; Drew Christiansen, S.J., is Distinguished Professor of Ethics and Global Development in Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and co-director of the Program on the Church and the World at the Berkley Center, where he is a senior research fellow,
<https://books.google.com/books?id=xp6JwmU4IXUC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=%22create+peace%22+%22moral+obligation%22&source=bl&ots=01kMwHsxT7&sig=xpfCV-RYdFyW83v6N0AZF6u6zlQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjLIOTuhrXOAhVLIMAKHbWMDxkQ6AEIHzAB#v=onepage&q=%22create%20peace%22%20%22moral%20obligation%22&f=false>

Even in the context of condemning war in the strongest possible terms, these texts do not refer to peace as a residual category. "Peace is not merely the absence of war." ⁶ This point deserves emphasis because we automatically associate "the end of war" with "peace." Recall, for example, powerful images in the collective American memory of the explosion of joy in Times Square, August 1945, at the end of World War II. Certainly, the moral obligation to end war commands the highest urgency. However, ending war does not automatically create peace. It may afford a particularly promising opportunity to construct peace -- one we may choose either to act upon or to squander. The obligation to act upon -- not squander -- such an opportunity also commands the highest moral urgency. For that matter, the obligation to make peace has urgent priority even when there is no obvious opportunity to do so.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Consequentialist Impact Scenario Framing Answers

Framing Turn: Worst case predictions cause failed policy making, trade off with better solutions, and risk escalation – we need to prioritize probability over magnitude

Bruce **Schneier** March 13, **2010**, Worst-Case Thinking, Schneier on Security, Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist and author, MA CS American University, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case_thin.html

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "**My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios.**" There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won't arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it

incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Deontological Impact Scenario Answers

Turn: CCP collapse would be good – it's the only way to save the environment

Richard **Smith**, December 31, **2015**, Revolution or Collapse: China's rise has come at horrific social and environmental cost, Infoshop News, excerpt from "China's Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse" in Real World Economics Review, Dr. Richard Smith is an analyst at the Institute for Policy Research & Development - wrote his UCLA history Ph.D thesis on the contradictions of market reforms in China - At present he is completing a book on capitalist development and global ecological collapse, chapters of which have appeared as articles in the Journal of Ecological Economics, Capitalism Socialism Nature, and Real-World Economics Review, news.infoshop.org/asia/revolution-or-collapse

Revolution or collapse: One thing is certain: this locomotive is not going to be stopped so long as the Communist Party has its grip on the controls. The Chinese Communist Party is locked in a death spiral. It can't rein in corruption because the party is built on corruption, thrives on corruption and can't police itself. It can't rein in ravenous resource consumption and suicidal pollution because, given its dependence on the market to generate new jobs, it has to prioritize growth over the environment like capitalist governments everywhere. It can't even discipline its own subordinate officials to enforce and obey the government's environmental, food and drug safety, building codes and similar laws because in this system subordinate officials aren't necessarily subordinate and can often mobilize their family and guanxi-based backers to defend their interests and thwart Beijing. So long as this basic structural class/property arrangement remains in effect, no top-down "war on pollutions" or "war on corruption" is going to change this system or brake China's trajectory to ecological collapse. Given the foregoing, I just don't see how China's spiral to collapse can be reversed short of social revolution.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Deontological Impact Scenario Framing Answers

Environmental sustainability our primary moral obligation

Bill Klemm, 2003, Why Do We Have to Protect the Environment?, Environmental Protection, Dr. W. R. (Bill) Klemm is Senior Professor of Neuroscience & Professor of Veterinary Integrative Biosciences at Texas A&M university, peer.tamu.edu/curriculum_modules/Ecosystems/module_4/whyitmatters.htm

The human species needs food and water. We need energy. But we also need to protect the ecosystem niches that make survival of our species possible. Beyond that, we need to protect the niches for other species too. Why do niches need protection? It's not nice to try to fool Mother Nature. Ecosystems are complicated. We have seen in these lessons that complexity grows as we move up the ladder from cells to organ systems to ecosystems. The history of our attempts to manipulate ecosystems shows that we often make mistakes and fail to see the unintended consequences of our actions. Rich ecosystems are those with many occupied niches. A change in any one niche is likely to affect other niches and their occupant species. **Extinction is forever. We don't get a second chance.** Environmental hazards are dangerous. Especially our lakes and oceans have become dumping grounds for dangerous chemicals (pesticides, herbicides, oil and refinery products, industrial wastes, and heavy metals). Some of these toxins actually concentrate in food webs, such as mercury in fish. Moral obligation. Our species owes its existence to the living world that we share with other species. We owe the living world a chance to perpetuate the life-creating processes of natural selection, population dynamics, and exchange cycles. **We can only pay this debt by protecting the environment.**

Counter plan Answers (Consult ASEAN) – SCS

Permutation

Permutation: Non-bindingly consult with ASEAN then do the plan

Permutation Solves: Non-binding consultation can solve the net benefit and our turns

Daily Oklahoman June 12, **2001**, Field Trip Bush Should Stay the Course in Europe, The Oklahoman is a daily newspaper that covers issues related to Oklahoma, newsok.com/article/2744661

WITH his arrival in Spain this morning, President Bush begins a five-day trip to European countries, many of whose leaders are eager to lecture him on missile defense, global warming and - following the execution of Timothy McVeigh - the death penalty. We hope the president will listen politely but stay the course. The United States always should consult with its allies. But consultation doesn't mean conformity with a raft of liberal-to-socialist views now popular in a number of European capitals. "You can go through the motions of consulting as long as you don't ask and do tell," Kenneth Adelman, a veteran of the Reagan administration, told the New York Times. "You can ask opinions, but the fact is Europeans don't like change and Americans like change."

Counter plan Answers (Consult ASEAN) - SCS

Solvency answers

Doesn't solve: ASEAN will say no because they can't agree on the SCS issue – China exploits the “fault line” in the alliance

Sampa **Kundu** May 16th **2016**, “China divides ASEAN in the South China Sea” East Asia Forum, Dr. Sampa Kundu is a researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/21/china-divides-asean-in-the-south-china-sea/> FRF

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's whirlwind tour of Brunei, Cambodia and Laos during 22–24 April 2016 courted support for his country's territorial claims in the South China Sea. But **the issue of China's policy in the South China Sea has created a fault line across**

ASEAN, complicating the unity and effectiveness of the regional grouping. The most pressing issue on Wang's agenda during his visits to Brunei, Cambodia and Laos was dispute resolution in the South China Sea, though political and economic cooperation were also discussed. In Brunei, his first destination, Wang emphasised China's 'dual-track approach' as a way to solve territorial disputes between China and Southeast Asian countries. This approach endorses the handling of disputes bilaterally by the directly affected countries, and the joint maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea by both China and ASEAN. An aerial photograph of Woody Island in the disputed Spratly Islands. (Photo: AAP) Following his visit to Brunei, Wang spent one day in Cambodia and met Foreign Minister Prak Sokhon. The following day in Laos, he met Lao Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, General Secretary of the Party Central Committee and President Bounnhang Vorachith, and Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith. Wang's visit to Laos received wide attention in the region since Laos, as the Chair of ASEAN in 2016, is expected to play a key role in mediating China's disputes with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Wang emphasised during his visit that China's One Belt One Road initiative, which proposes a China–Laos railway link, would boost Laos' agenda of transforming itself from a land-locked to a land-linked nation. For Laos' part, Saleumxay Kommasith conveyed that, as the current Chair of ASEAN, Laos will try to further mobilise discussion on the execution of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and negotiations on a formal Code of Conduct. Wang's tour of the three countries underscores China's eagerness to develop substantial backing within the region as The Hague prepares to give its verdict on the Philippines' arbitration case against China's 'nine-dash line' claims. **Any public support from the region will add legitimacy to China's**

position against allowing third parties to intervene in South China Sea disputes. Following the visits, the Chinese foreign ministry published a four-point consensus that Wang claimed was agreed upon **with** his counterparts in **Brunei, Cambodia and Laos.** The consensus stated that, first, disputes over the Spratly islands are not an ASEAN–China issue and should not have any implications on China–ASEAN relations. Second, every sovereign state is free to choose their own way to resolve rows and no unilateral decision can be imposed on them. Third, dialogues and consultations under Article 4 of the DOC are the best way to solve the South China Sea disputes. Fourth, China and ASEAN together can effectively maintain peace and security in the region. **This four-point consensus,** alongside Wang's tour of Southeast Asia, **reiterates that China has once again successfully capitalised on divisions prevalent among the ASEAN nations when it comes to South China Sea disputes.** By supporting China's four-point consensus, **Brunei, Cambodia and Laos have expressed that they will neither join Vietnam and the Philippines** (and increasingly Indonesia too) **in their fights against China's assertiveness in South China Sea nor seek multilateral dispute resolution. The last point in the 'consensus' stresses that China and these three ASEAN countries do not want the involvement of outside powers (like the United States)**

in South China Sea disputes, as they believe only regional powers should manage peace and stability in East Asia. But **China's assertive diplomacy in Southeast Asia has raised questions about Laos' ability to promote unity and open dialogue across ASEAN** in 2016. In light of the United States' insistence that it will continue its freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's recent announcement of joint patrols with Manila, China is likely be more assertive in pushing its dispute resolution agenda onto its allies in the region. **This was not the first time China has been successful in drawing dividing lines within ASEAN.** During Myanmar's tenure as Chair of ASEAN in 2014 the smaller economy had to face the challenge of considering the interests of Vietnam and Philippines on the one hand and China on the other. After Wang Yi's three-nation tour, Lao President Bounnhang Vorachith attempted a conciliatory gesture towards the other members of ASEAN by immediately paying a friendly visit to Hanoi. But it remains to be seen whether this visit will be enough to assure Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries, of Laos' ability to lead ASEAN with a pragmatic diplomatic attitude. Some argue that China is too big a power for ASEAN's smaller economies to raise a tough voice against its territorial claims and its rejection of third-party dispute resolution. Yet Vietnam and the Philippines are passionate about maintaining their demands in the South China Sea. The involvement of extra-regional powers suits their interests. **The**

confluence of these opposing interests is making Southeast Asia one of the most unsettled regions in the world. Managing this tension will be a considerable challenge for ASEAN into the future.

Counter plan Answers (Consult ASEAN) - SCS

Net Benefit Answers

Solvency Turn: ASEAN is currently the driver of Asian stability WITHOUT the US, but fracture among states or perceived bias would undermine ASEAN credibility

Pek Koon Heng, 2014, The "ASEAN Way" and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Pek Koon Heng is Assistant Professor at School of International Service at American University in Washington DC, she got her PhD, London University's School of Oriental and African Studies; MA, BA, Auckland University, cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33878/RSCAS_2014_121.pdf?sequence=1

When examining ASEAN's role in promoting regional cooperation and integration, scholars have utilized realist, neo-liberal or constructivist perspectives, or an eclectic combination of all three (see, e.g., Acharya 2009a, Ba 2009, Busse 1999, Emmers 2012, Goh 2008, Jones & Smith 2006, Nischalke 2000, Ravenhill 2013, Sheldon 2014). While some scholars remain highly skeptical that the ASEAN Way, as currently constituted, could ever underpin a robust regional security regime (Jones & Smith 2006, Nischalke 2000), others have evaluated the grouping's contributions more positively (Acharya 2013, Ba 2012, Busse 1999, Goh, 2012, Capie 2012, Kraft 2012). In contrast to Jones and Smith's critique of ASEAN as a "fading institution" with "a peripheral rather than core role in regional growth and stability" (2006: 159, 277), Evelyn Goh argues that ASEAN "is universally acceptable as the 'driver' of regionalism", which has critically claimed a "voice" for smaller states in discussing and managing regional security affairs in a situation where great powers are suspicious of each other (Goh 2012: 105, 112). Other scholars such as David Capie, while recognizing the weaknesses underlying the process and institutionalization of the ASEAN Way of regional cooperation, nevertheless concludes that ASEAN "has proved far more resilient than many could have predicted just a few years ago" (Capie 2012: 179). Amitav Acharya, while agreeing that ASEAN has successfully functioned as the fulcrum of geopolitical stability in Asia, cautions that ASEAN leaders need to retain unity, strengthen mechanisms for cooperation, and maintain a "neutral broker image among great powers" in order to continue to play that role (2013: 21).

Counter plan Answers (Consult ASEAN) - SCS

Net Benefit Answers

Link Turn: US consultation with ASEAN over SCS increases instability

Xinhua News Service, February 17, 2016, China: US-ASEAN relationship should benefit regional peace, CCTV America, Xinhua is a leading news service in mainland china, www.cctv-america.com/2016/02/17/china-us-asean-relationship-should-benefit-regional-peace

China said on Wednesday that the development of relationship between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should be conducive to regional stability and development. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei made the remarks when asked to comment on a gathering between U.S. President Barack Obama and leaders of Southeast Asian countries on Monday and Tuesday. In a joint statement issued after the meeting, the two sides shared a commitment to “maintain peace, security and stability in the region, ensuring maritime security and safety, including the rights of freedom of navigation and overflight.” “We have taken note of the attempt by some country to use the summit to stir up the South China Sea issue, but most of ASEAN members did not agree, because such a move will not only damage trust among countries in the region, but will interfere with their efforts in safeguarding the peace and stability in the South China Sea,” said Hong at a routine press briefing. Obama told a news conference that the two sides “discussed the need for tangible steps in the South China Sea to lower tensions, including a halt to further reclamation, new construction and militarization of disputed areas.” When asked to comment on Obama’s remarks, Hong said the United States is not a party concerned with the South China Sea issue and should be cautious with its words and actions. He said the United States should help create a sound atmosphere for talks and the pursue of a peaceful solution to disputes, rather than playing up tensions and sowing discord in the region.

Counter plan Answers (Consult ASEAN) - SCS

Net Benefit Answers

Link Turn: US-ASEAN cooperation only re-entrenches China, leads to more island building

Sam **LaGrone** March 20, **2015**, U.S. 7th Fleet Would Support ASEAN South China Sea Patrols, US Naval Institute, Sam LaGrone is the editor of USNI News. He was formerly the U.S. Maritime Correspondent for the Washington D.C. bureau of Jane's Defence Weekly and Jane's Navy International. In his role he covered legislation, acquisition and operations for the Sea Services and spent time underway with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the Canadian Navy, <https://news.usni.org/2015/03/20/u-s-7th-fleet-would-support-asean-south-china-sea-patrols>

Pentagon officials gave the plan a tacit endorsement in a Friday statement to USNI News. "The Department welcomes collaborative efforts to bolster maritime security in the Asia-Pacific, including ASEAN-led efforts. We believe that close cooperation between and among ASEAN member-states is critical to sustaining peace and prosperity in the region," Pentagon spokeswoman Henrietta Levin said in a statement.

"However, at this time, we are not aware of any specific plans or proposals by ASEAN countries to develop a combined maritime force." Any maritime patrol force with U.S. involvement or approval would certainly flare Chinese tempers. The South China Sea contested territorial claims have been a constant issue between ASEAN countries and China. A map of China's shifting definition of the so-called Nine-Dash Line. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have clashed with China politically over claims to the Spratley and Paracel Island chains and has conducted extensive reclamation work for military facilities. A regional code of conduct between China and ASEAN countries has been in the works since 2013 but has largely been stalled. As to the patrols, there is some precedent for combined ASEAN operations. The scheme could be based on the existing model of combined ASEAN forces anti-piracy patrol in the Strait of Malacca near Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, according to press reports in the Philippines quoting Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command (FOIC) Vice Adm. Jesus Millan. "Vice Adm. Millan [said] that for this 'resource intensive initiative' to work, all countries concerned should agree in working together in protecting the 'Freedom of Navigation' or the safety and security of seaborne trade and international shipping," read the online report from radio station DWDD. The plan follows comments from 7th Fleet's Thomas in January that suggested Japan should consider surface and air patrols in the South China Sea, which quickly drew the ire of the Chinese. "Countries outside this region should respect efforts made by countries in the region to maintain peace and stability," said Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying in late January.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Consequentialist Impact Scenario - Framing

Any use of nuclear weapons will escalate and cause extinction – we have an obligation to prevent nuclear omnicide

Larry **Ross**, December 10 **2003**, "RACING TOWARD EXTINCTION," Larry Ross is founder of NZ Nuclear-Free Peacemaking Association, <http://nuclearfree.lynx.co.nz/racing.html>

We have greatly changed our environment with our new destructive tools - nuclear weapons. They have given us a quantum leap in our ability to destroy ourselves and world. Given present trends, we will not adapt, but will continue on the present path to nuclear extinction. However, our brains provide the vital difference between extinct species and us. They can tell us what we have created, and the probable results if we keep repeating our historically destructive behaviour - the thousands of wars in our history. Our unique insight allows us to change our behaviour so we don't repeat our traditional pattern of destruction with our new earth-destroying tools. We have even recognised the extreme risks to ourselves, by creating treaties committing us to vigorously pursue disarmament steps to abolish nuclear weapons before they abolish us. Unfortunately, we have not observed these treaties. The essential question is: Will we use our brains constructively to solve this problem in time to save ourselves? It seems unlikely. We are using our brains to deny the terrifying reality, pretend there is no risk, or that it is insignificant. Many believe that nuclear weapons have been proven over 50 years to give us security. We tend to venerate our leaders, believe and obey them. Like the Germans did with Adolph Hitler, or Italians with Mussolini. Leaders are respected as rational, sensible, honest, moral Christians who could never do anything crazy. However President Bush - the world's most powerful man, and his allies and staff, have lowered the barriers against using nuclear weapons. They have developed new doctrines that allow them to use nuclear weapons in many more war situations and against non-nuclear states - not just in retaliation for a massive attack. The U.S. Congress and mass media have skirted this issue, so you may not know about this 'seismic' change in U.S. policy and its implications. People have forgot, or never learned, how nuclear weapons can destroy our world. Here is a chart with 6,000 dots divided into 100 squares. The one dot in the centre represents all the explosive power of allied bombs dropped in WWII - equal to 3,000,000 tons of TNT or 3 megatons. Millions were killed. We have enough for about 6,000 WWII's. The dots in just one of the 100 squares represent the firepower to kill all life on earth. We have made enough weapons to kill everyone on earth many times over. That is our dire situation today. We are not adapting to change our behaviour, but reinforcing old behaviour that leads to war? The nuclear arms race, accelerated by the vested interests of the military-industrial-political complex, and the phantom threats we invent to sustain it, is the major occupation of many top brains and huge resources today. It has huge momentum and power. It is embedded in U.S. society and some others. It is an accepted part of the culture. This weapons culture and the new doctrines mean that nuclear weapons are no longer treated as a last resort. They can be used in addition to conventional weapons to achieve military goals. . The culture has programmed itself for self-destruction and now has the ideology to continue until they precipitate a nuclear holocaust which kills all life. The quantum leap in destructive power has now been matched by this new will, or self-permission, to use these weapons. Laws, fears and reservations have been swept aside. Humanity seems to have accepted the new doctrines. Few seem concerned that any usage can kill millions, and quickly expand beyond any countries control, leading to a global nuclear war which ends humanity. We have radically altered our environment in so many other ways as well, that also threaten our existence in the longer term. Population growth and our economic growth ideology augment the trends of climate change - global warming - pollution - dwindling natural resources - deforestation etc. To emphasise again, the biggest change we have made in our environment is the quantum leap in our ability to destroy ourselves. Our psychological and social climate makes it more probable. Most people are not aware of this huge change in our environment. Others just accept it. We have learned to live with and treat nuclear weapons as a normal part of the environment. Many feel that to question or oppose this situation is silly, disloyal or threatens the security we think nuclear weapons give us. Nine countries are dedicated to constantly developing their nuclear arsenals. That makes accidental or intentional usage more likely. That the U.S. has said the nuclear barriers are down adds to the likelihood of nuclear weapons use by some other state. A probable escalation would follow.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Deontology Impact Scenario – Impact

Collapse bad – would lead to massive instability and more oppressive successor

Dan **Blumenthal & William Inboden**, May 8, **2015**, Toward a free and democratic China, American Enterprise Institute, Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. William Inboden is executive director of the Clements Center for History, Strategy, and Statecraft and associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, <https://www.aei.org/publication/toward-a-free-and-democratic-china/>

In short, China's ruling structures are brittle, costly, and strained by the corrosive effects of corruption, environmental calamities, and lack of popular consent. The fact that China spends more on internal surveillance and policing than on its military only confirms that the CCP's greatest fear is of its own citizens, not an external rival like the United States. The real threat to Chinese stability comes from possible state collapse or revolution, without a peaceful civil society to step in and help manage the subsequent vacuum. Adding a freedom prong to the engage and hedge strategy is the most prudent course for dealing with this possibility. It helps answer the question "Then what?" If, through whatever course of events, the CCP were to lose its monopoly on power, what political authorities would emerge to take its place? Right now the CCP is successfully repressing all vestiges of civil society; Burke's "little platoons" of civic organizations and religious groups that mediate between the individual and the state are nowhere to be found. This does not mean that China's collapse is imminent. The CCP is resilient and acutely aware of the demise of past authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union. That said, when have we ever correctly predicted a massive political change in a major country? Those who fear change in China fear—with justification—an Arab Spring scenario from which something much worse than the current leadership would emerge. But American policy does little to mitigate this scenario. A freedom prong would cultivate and support alternatives in anticipation of the day when the CCP as currently constituted might no longer be in control. How might a greater American effort to support freedom in China affect the overall U.S.-China relationship? Probably less than one might think in the short term, and certainly less than the profound disruption some China experts fear. Beijing can always be counted on to act in its own perceived interest, and the CCP still prioritizes a stable bilateral relationship with the United States. Increased U.S. support for human rights and rule of law programs, and more meetings with dissidents, would doubtless provoke some annoyed *démarches* from Beijing and the usual grumblings about "meddling in China's internal affairs," but little more. The CCP is nothing if not ruthlessly pragmatic. It might note the continued existence of the KMT in Taiwanese politics and prepare itself to compete in real elections. A new China strategy with a freedom prong is a high-risk and high-reward proposition. Before President Obama, all post-Cold War U.S. presidents favored encouraging China's peaceful evolution. Their mistake was a misreading of past Asian transitions to democracy, which they believed were inevitable. They were not. Instead, American presidents mixed sound political judgment with carrot and stick policies that sometimes risked far worse outcomes. But the reward for their successes is self-evident in our vibrant alliances today with Asian democracies. With China, the United States may be reaching an inflection point. Our present path is likely to lead to a high-risk, volatile rivalry with an increasingly unstable regime. The alternative path holds out the hope of leading gradually to Sino-American comity and an enduring peace. It begins with supporting those Chinese people who seek more freedom and a better future for their country.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Deontology Impact Scenario - Framing

Maintaining peace and conditions for harmony is a moral obligation

Gerard F. **Powers & Drew Christiansen, 1994**, Peacemaking: Moral and Policy Challenges for a New World, United States

Catholic Conference, Georgetown University Press, pages 45-46, Gerard Powers is professor of the practice of Catholic peacebuilding at the Kroc Institute. He also coordinates the Catholic Peacebuilding Network; Drew Christiansen, S.J., is Distinguished Professor of Ethics and Global Development in Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and co-director of the Program on the Church and the World at the Berkley Center, where he is a senior research fellow,

<https://books.google.com/books?id=xp6JwmU4IXUC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=%22create+peace%22+%22moral+obligation%22&source=bl&ots=01kMwHsxT7&sig=xpfCV->

RYdFyW83v6N0AZF6u6zlQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjLIOTuhrXOAhVLIMAKHbWMDxkQ6AEIHzAB#v=onepage&q=%22create%20peace%22%20%22moral%20obligation%22&f=false

Even in the context of condemning war in the strongest possible terms, these texts do not refer to peace as a residual category. "**Peace is not merely the absence of war.**" ⁶ This point deserves emphasis because we automatically associate "the end of war" with "peace." Recall, for example, powerful images in the collective American memory of the explosion of joy in Times Square, August 1945, at the end of World War II. Certainly, the moral obligation to end war commands the highest urgency. However, ending war does not automatically create peace. It may afford a particularly promising opportunity to construct peace – one we may choose either to act upon or to squander. The obligation to act upon – not squander – such an opportunity also commands the highest moral urgency. For that matter, **the obligation to make peace has urgent priority** even when there is no obvious opportunity to do so.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Impact Answers

Impact Turn: Worst case predictions cause failed policy making, trade off with better solutions, and risk escalation – we need to prioritize probability

Bruce **Schneier** March 13, **2010**, Worst-Case Thinking, Schneier on Security, Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist and author, MA CS American University, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case_thin.html

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "**My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios.**" There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won't arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it

incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

International Law Advantage Answers - SCS

Impact Answers

Positive peace is an uncritical, empty moral framework – looking at actual scenarios is more important

Peter **Lawler**, March **2002**, Peace Review; Mar2002, Vol. 14 Issue 1, p7, Peter Lawler is Senior lecturer in international relations, University of Manchester https://www.academia.edu/6093860/Peace_Research_War_and_the_Problem_of_Focus?auto=download

My principal concern at the time was with the growing preoccupation of much of peace research (or peace studies) with the issue of “structural violence” and the pursuit of such goals as justice, human fulfilment, or a more just world order—in short, the realization of positive peace. As laudable and important as such objectives clearly are, I was unconvinced at the time that peace research brought anything distinctive to them. Such concerns now lay at the heart of a wide range of social scientific disciplines. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of post-positivist theorizing across the social sciences, perhaps most importantly in the fields of international relations and security studies, had eroded the normative distinctiveness of peace research to a significant extent. I went on to suggest that peace research might reacquire focus by self-consciously serving as a conduit between theoretical and conceptual developments across the social sciences and the continuing problem of direct violence within and between states. By this I did not mean that peace research should simply reduce itself to conflict analysis or return to the quasi-scientism of its foundational years. Rather, I envisaged a normatively informed peace research engaging critically with orthodox discourses (in the Foucauldian sense) of security and strategy. In more practical terms, I envisaged peace research as a site for cutting-edge research into the resolution of the various extremely violent conflicts that have marked the post-Cold-War era. Although such an engagement clearly requires consideration of the structural impetuses to the outbreak of violence, I did not see the analysis of the origins and development of such things as exploitation and poverty as the appropriate primary focus of peace research. Why? Because I felt this contributed to the dissipation of peace research’s impact. This would continue the problem of peace research being perceived as the conceptually impoverished cousin of various other disciplines, such as political economy, sociology and so on, where research into such issues is vastly more diverse and developed. My book hardly flew off the shelves in vast numbers, nor did my observations cause much of a ripple in peace research circles. Galtung’s own response was confined to a couple of dismissive sentences in the introduction to one of his recent books. Most reactions to my argument arose in the context of presentations by myself at conferences, seminars and such. Of those who did comment, in writing or to me personally, a minority supported my sentiments but the majority took the view that I was arguing for peace research effectively to shift back to a focus on negative peace and this could hardly be a forward step. Some accused me of being conservative, reactionary even. I now teach and research primarily in the field of international relations and here, by contrast, the perception that I am a critic of peace research, and Galtung in particular, has generally met with either approval or acute disinterest. This is in spite of the fact that many, although by no means all, of my disciplinary colleagues apparently share the normative sentiments of many peace researchers. In other words, for many international relations scholars, peace research continues to have an image problem. True, the crassest form of an international relations critique of peace research still falls back on the tired dualism of realism versus idealism, with peace research firmly and pejoratively located within the latter. A more serious critique, however, revolves around three common perceptions of peace research: the absence of a substantial theoretical or conceptual core, a tendency to deploy uncritically key terms such as “structural violence” or “positive peace,” and an unclear standpoint with regard to direct violence, particularly the use of violence in the pursuit of justice or other values. These themes, threaded through my own analysis of Galtungian peace research, led me to the conclusion that, in spite of an overt value orientation, peace research could not provide an adequate account of its own normative nature.

Counterplan to SCS Aff (Consult ASEAN)

Counterplan Text

The United States Federal Government should engaging in binding consultation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations before substantially increasing its air and sea deployment and increasing its freedom of navigation operations in the East China Sea and South China Sea

Counterplan to SCS Aff (Consult ASEAN)

Solvency

ASEAN says yes – scared of china

DAN **De Luce & KEITH Johnson**, FEBRUARY 17, 2016, Crunch Time for Washington and Beijing in the South China Sea, Foreign policy, Dan De Luce is Foreign Policy's chief national security correspondent; Keith Johnson is a senior reporter covering energy for Foreign Policy, foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/crunch-time-for-washington-and-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/

Tellingly, Beijing deployed the advanced weaponry to the South China Sea just as President Obama hosted the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, at a two-day summit in California — the first to be held in the United States. As in recent years, dueling claims and provocative actions in the South China Sea dominated the talks. ASEAN members danced around an explicit condemnation of China's behavior, but in a joint statement at the end of the summit the Southeast Asian leaders specifically and unanimously agreed to uphold the international, rules-based order; eschew militarization of disputes; and respect freedom of navigation. China is not one of the 10 ASEAN member nations. To date, China's claims and land reclamation activities have driven many Asian nations closer to the United States. Tokyo and Washington revised their joint defense guidelines, and Japan has largely jettisoned its post-World War II pacifist stance. The Philippines is asking U.S. military forces to come back 25 years after kicking them out. Even Vietnam, a communist country with close trade ties with China, is moving closer to Washington and seeking to buy U.S. weaponry to push back against Beijing.

Counterplan to SCS Aff (Consult ASEAN)

Net Benefit Uniqueness and Link

ASEAN mistrusts the US because we don't consult them on regional security issues

Sheldon W. **Simon &** Evelyn **Goh**, September 21, **2007**, China, the United States, and South-East Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics (Asian Security Studies), SHELDON W. SIMON is Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate for the Center for Asian Studies and Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, where he has also served as Chair of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asian Studies - Evelyn Goh is Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific, she holds an DPhil, MPhil, and MA, <https://www.amazon.com/China-United-States-South-East-Asia/dp/0415569508>

In contrast, the United States is often perceived as displaying less commitment, attention, and care. US failure to consult ASEAN states on matters of Southeast Asian concern is a longstanding complaint but many in ASEAN nevertheless see it as indicative of the unimportance the United States attaches to Southeast Asia or a lack of interest in the region. Most recently, the United States has also been criticized for not paying enough attention to the concerns of Southeast Asian states and East and Southeast Asian issues. For example, of the major powers, the United States comes across as having the least respect or patience for ASEAN and ASEAN- derived processes. US officials that work with ASEAN can, in fact, be quite blunt about this. This leads to Washington's preference for dealing with states bilaterally, as opposed to multilaterally, but ASEAN consequently sees Washington as being less supportive of ASEAN as an organization. Some also worry about potentially divisive effects on ASEAN that come from this bilateral approach.

Counterplan to SCS Aff (Consult ASEAN)

Net Benefit Impact

US-ASEAN partnership accesses all major impacts – 5 reasons

Nina **Hachigian**, 17 February, **2016**, Ambassador Hachigian's Remarks at the U.S. ASEAN Business Council Conference, San Francisco, CA, US Mission to ASEAN, Nina Hachigian is US Ambassador to ASEAN, Ambassador Nina Hachigian was previously a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. She was the editor of *Debating China: The U.S. – China Relationship in Ten Conversations* and co-author of *The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise* (Simon & Schuster, 2008), as well as many reports on Asia policy, <https://asean.usmission.gov/ambassador-hachigians-remarks-at-the-u-s-asean-business-council-conference-san-francisco-ca/>

Now let me take a step back and address a basic question—What motivated President Obama to focus on ASEAN? Why did the US Government spent a relatively large amount of the most precious resource we have—the President's time at Sunnylands this week? In other words, why does ASEAN matter to the United States? The short answer is: We are investing in ASEAN because it is in our clear national interest to do so. ASEAN unity and integration benefit the United States. Of course there will always be other parts of the world that also need our attention. But there are many reasons the U.S. will retain a focus on ASEAN, no matter who the next President is. Let me share five reasons why I believe ASEAN is important to the U.S., from my vantage point in Jakarta, but it boils down to three words: growth, stability and rules. Economics You know the first one well: economics. ASEAN is important to American prosperity. Trade and investment with ASEAN means jobs and profits at home. American companies are by far the largest investors in Southeast Asia. U.S. private-sector cumulative investment is larger than China's, Japan's, and South Korea's combined. ASEAN countries are now returning the favor, directing their investment towards the United States, and a number of my fellow Ambassadors in the region have led reverse trade missions here. Investment in the United States by ASEAN countries has increased more than from any other region in the past decade. ASEAN is a rapidly growing region with an expanding workforce and a growing middle class. The ASEAN Community and, in particular, the ASEAN Economic Community, is good for U.S. business because many want to take a regional approach. Trade with ASEAN, reaching a quarter of a trillion dollars in 2014, makes ASEAN America's fourth largest trading partner. Importantly, this trade accounts for over half a million jobs in the U.S.— jobs in every single state in the Union. The ASEAN middle class is growing by leaps and bounds, with some reports suggesting that it will more than double by 2020. Importantly, ASEAN has a plan, a very detailed set of blueprints for the ASEAN Economic Community, to reach its ambitious goal of a single market and production base. And the plan has strong political will behind it. It won't happen overnight, but I am confident it will happen. To support the AEC, the United States government has been helping ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Single Window an electronic customs system to reduce red tape and customs opportunism in the region. It will launch with five ASEAN countries this year, and one day will connect all ten, so importers and exporters will only have to fill out paperwork once for the whole region. Transnational Challenges The second reason for our engagement is that ASEAN is a strategic partner for the U.S. on key transnational challenges that face us all— climate change, terrorism, cyber security, human trafficking and wildlife trafficking, to name a few. In Sunnylands, leaders agreed to work harder together to prevent such attacks as occurred in Jakarta, and San Bernardino. They also discussed trafficking in persons. ASEAN signed its landmark new Convention in 2015. Two ASEAN nations have already ratified it and once six have done so, it will go into effect and there will be better tools for combatting what President Obama has called “modern slavery.” We will work with ASEAN to help implement the Convention. Another challenge that I have focused on during my time in the region is the degradation of marine and coastal ecosystems. Southeast Asia is home to a greater concentration of marine biodiversity than anywhere else in the world. The waters there support many thousands of fish species and other marine animals that are vital for maintaining healthy ecosystems, offering livelihoods for millions of people in Southeast Asia, and providing seafood that they eat and that we in the U.S. also consume every day. This marine bounty, and its beauty, is under severe threat. Climate change, the construction of artificial islands on coral reefs, harvesting of endangered species, and illegal and overfishing are all happening to an alarming degree. We are partners with ASEAN on all these fronts. Moreover, new regulations that the U.S. will enact this year to help prevent illegally caught fish from entering our ports will send a powerful market signal to the region and will, I think and hope, change behavior on the ground. Geopolitics The third reason the United States will have a long-term focus on ASEAN is because an integrated, unified ASEAN is geopolitically stabilizing. It is stabilizing because ASEAN works to institutionalize cooperation, threatens no one, dedicates itself to non-violence and seeks strategic independence. ASEAN forms the stable center of a region with multiple big powers— China, Japan, India and the United States each have a major stake. Whereas it could be difficult for any one ASEAN country to stand up to a big power when it takes actions that increase tensions and risks, ASEAN as a group can and has. We want Asia to

continue to enjoy the peace that has allowed so many to prosper, and ASEAN is a critical part of that. In this sense, ASEAN leads by example. It has helped preserve stability among its incredibly diverse member nations for nearly 50 years. If you think about the tumultuous geopolitical environment in Southeast Asia at the time of ASEAN's founding in 1967, it is remarkable that ASEAN managed to forge and keep the peace until today. Further economic integration will only increase the stabilizing political role ASEAN plays.

Convening Power Fourth in my list of why the United States cares about ASEAN is that ASEAN convenes Asia. No one else can bring all the countries of Asia together at the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and other for a every year to discuss difficult strategic questions. At the East Asia Summit last November in Kuala Lumpur, President Obama and leaders of half the world's population discussed key political and security issues facing the region and globe. We believe that it is vital that officials discuss these issues and not sweep them under the rug. **Rules-Based Order in Asia** Finally, but in some ways most important in my list of five reasons why the United States is focused on ASEAN is this: ASEAN plays a vital role in advancing the rules-based order for the Asia Pacific. What binds ASEAN together is a shared commitment to a set of principles. Three of them are: the importance of rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the upholding of international law. Rules and norms provide the connective tissue of the ASEAN Community. Common approaches, standards and rules are the currency of ASEAN; it is through their harmonization that countries are integrating. ASEAN also shares our respect for international law which connects it to outside powers and defines expectations for our behavior. Rules and norms create predictability. They create a sense of fairness because all countries have the same burden of compliance and responsibility. Common rules and norms foster habits of cooperation. In other words, over time, when countries follow shared rules and norms they can create trust. That is not easy, but in ASEAN, because the ten countries agree on some basic principles and have built up an infrastructure of rules and norms, they have developed a baseline of trust. Beyond the five reasons I have discussed, the United States and ASEAN are, of course, connected through personal and cultural links. The United States is a Pacific nation, and we are bound to Southeast Asia by millions of threads through families, through educational exchanges, through tourism. These enduring ties bind us in friendship and humanity. For these reasons and more, America will remain deeply engaged in ASEAN for generations to come. As Secretary Kerry has said: "The future of the United States and the future of ASEAN are absolutely interconnected." I hope to see you out in the region soon. Thank you.

Counterplan to SCS Aff (Consult ASEAN)

Permutation

Permutation fails: ASEAN will discover the lie – government will leak the secret

James Q. **Wilson**, John J. **Dilulio**, & Meena **Bose**, 2013, American Government: Brief Version, p. 131, James Q. Wilson is Professor of Political Science at UCLA; John J. Dilulio is Professor of Political Science at Princeton, Meena Bose is Executive Dean of Hofstra University's Peter S. Kalikow School of Government, Public Policy, and International Affairs, and Director of Hofstra's Peter S. Kalikow Center for the Study of the American Presidency,
https://books.google.com/books?id=Td11cDI2MvoC&dq=%22American+government+is+the+leakiest+in+the+world.+The+bureaucracy,+members+of+Congress,+and+the+White+House+staff+regularly+leak+stories+favorable+to+their+interests.+Of+late+the+leaks+have%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s

American government is the leakiest in the world. The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late the leaks have become geysers, gushing forth torrents of insider stories. Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long. Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution. Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad. There are far fewer leaks in other democratic nations in part because power is centralized in the hands of a prime minister, who does not need to leak in order to get the upper hand over the legislature, and because the legislature has too little information to be a good source of leaks. In addition, we have no Official Secrets Act of the kind that exists in England; except for a few matters, it is not against the law for the press to receive and print government secrets.