

South China Sea Affirmative

Plan Text - SCS

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its air and sea deployment and increase its freedom of navigation operations in the East China Sea and South China Sea

Inherency - SCS

US presence in East Asia is insufficient now

Michael **Auslin**, September 22, **2015**, Time for realism in US-China relations, American Enterprise Institute, Michael Auslin is a resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he specializes in Asian regional security and political issues., <https://www.aei.org/publication/time-for-realism-in-us-china-relations/>

In addition, it is past time for the U.S. to act as the guarantor of regional stability that it claims to be. That means sending U.S. ships and planes right up to the edges of China's manmade islands in the South China Sea, something that Obama Administration admitted in Senate testimony last week that it was not doing. By not challenging China's territorial claims we are in essence confirming them, and sending a message of political weakness to our allies in Asia. A China that knows we will employ our military strength where it is most in question will be far more circumspect in its attempts to undermine the rules of international behavior.

Inherency - SCS

Current Freedom of Navigation Operations are insufficient

MATTHEW Pennington, Apr. 27, 2016, Lawmaker urge more US naval operations in South China Sea, Associated Press, Matthew Pennington is Reporter, Asia-US Affairs at Associated Press based out of Washington DC, hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/cae69a7523db45408eeb2b3a98c0c9c5/Article_2016-04-27-US--United%20States-China/id-f4c0f64c008c4ff1802a4514eeca131

Republicans said such "freedom of navigation" operations cruising within 12 nautical miles of the manmade islands — what China might consider as their territorial waters — should become routine. "I don't know why we are not doing it weekly, or monthly," said the committee chairman, GOP Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee, noting the U.S. has about 60 percent of its naval vessels in the Pacific region. Republican Sen. Cory Gardner of Colorado said sending U.S. ships into the area every three months "is simply insufficient to send a strong message to China." Corker contended that China has positioned itself as a geopolitical rival of the United States. "Merely managing differences with China is not a successful formula particularly when such management cedes U.S. influence and places American interest at risk in the Indo-Pacific and beyond," Corker said. Blinken agreed with Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida that China's objective was control of the entire South China Sea. Blinken said China was alienating its neighbors and risked "conflict, instability and isolation' unless it changed its approach and clarified its claims in accordance with international law. "As long as the United States remains fully present in the region, any tactical advantage that China derives from some of these outposts will be vastly outweighed by the net effect of surrounding itself with increasingly angry, increasingly suspicious neighbors who are increasingly close to the United States," he said. But Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez of New Jersey said that China was "dominating" the region. He advocated a tougher U.S. stance, saying American instruments of national power "are only useful when they are fully deployed." China claims virtually the entire South China Sea, an area that contains some of the world's busiest sea lanes. Although the U.S. is not a claimant, it says it has a national interest in freedom of navigation and maintaining stability there.

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Uniqueness

Inaction is killing US hegemony in Asia

Joseph **Bosco**, June 03, **2015**, US Must Hold Firm in South China Sea Dispute, The Diplomat, , Joseph A. Bosco, national security consultant, retired in 2010 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where his portfolios over a seven-year period included strategic communications and Muslim outreach, East Asia security affairs, Iraq and Afghanistan coalition affairs, and disaster relief and humanitarian affairs, among other assignments, thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-must-hold-firm-in-south-china-sea-dispute/

In the unfolding crisis in the SCS, however, the U.S. no longer has the option to look away. As Defense Secretary Ashton Carter declared at the Shangri-La defense ministers' meeting last week, the United States has a direct and enduring interest in freedom of navigation and overflight in all international waters and airspace. Beyond self-interest, America has kept the maritime and aviation public commons open to all nations for more than seven decades. **Allowing China unilaterally to carve out a gigantic exception to Washington's global role in the vital SCS shipping lanes would constitute an incalculable diminution of U.S. power and prestige.**

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Uniqueness

South China Sea is key to US hegemony in Asia – must act now or lose

Patrick **Cronin**, May 13, **2015**, Retaining America's Balance in the Asia Pacific: Countering Chinese Coercion in Southeast Asia, Center for a New American Security, Dr. Patrick Cronin Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program Center for a New American Security, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf

We are in the midst of an intensifying competition in Asia. The main driver of this competition is an ever-more powerful China determined to set the rules of engagement around its vast periphery. The South China Sea is the locus of rivalry. In seeking to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, China may well believe it is simply reclaiming its historic position as the dominant regional power. It may also think that its actions are defensive, designed to protect its security, access to resources, and vital sea lines of communication. But it realizes that the post World War II order largely built by the United States still obstructs this objective. Thus, many Chinese hope to displace the United States while gradually dominating its neighbors in a manner unlikely to trigger any decisive or timely response. This is effectively Chinese regional hegemony in slow motion. In Washington, too often the urgent crowds out the important. If we wait for the important changes presently underway in Southeast Asia to develop on their current trajectory, the United States and its allies and partners will soon not only lose substantial leverage over the rules and norms of behavior in this region but also may well face larger security risks in the future.

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Internal Link

Lack of US action leads to more island building and results in regional instability. The longer the US waits the more serious our actions to stop China will have to be

JERRY **Hendrix**, May 24, **2016**, Is War with China Now Inevitable?, National Review, Jerry Hendrix is a retired Navy Captain, a former director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, and a senior fellow and director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments program at the Center for a New American Security. Read more at: <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435749/us-china-war-obama-weakness-east-asia>, www.nationalreview.com/article/435749/us-china-war-obama-weakness-east-asia

Nations work out their differences through consistent and credible interactions. Exercises and real-world operations allow states to define their interests and then defend them. Competitor nations take these opportunities to test the will of states they are challenging. The consistency of these activities allows tensions between states to be released at a constant rate, so that pressures never rise to dangerous levels. But **when a nation vacates the arena of competition for too long or fails to conduct credible exercises, as the United States has done in the Western Pacific over the past five years, strains begin to warp the fabric of the international order.** China's construction of artificial islands as a means of extending its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea have left the United States with few options. The U.S. can continue its policy of sending mixed messages, dispatching individual warships on "innocent-passage" profiles that come within twelve miles of the islands while avoiding normal military operations, but this will only play into China's plan to slowly boil the frog as it continues arming the islands, establishing a new security status quo in the region. China's strategy mirrors Russia's actions in Georgia, the Crimea, and Ukraine. There, Russian forces operated below the U.S.'s radar, conducting phase I and II operations and standing pat in the face of international sanctions, confident that neither the United States nor its NATO allies really wanted to risk war to re-institute the regional order that had just been upended. China clearly feels that time is on its side so long as it only incrementally expands its influence, avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. **Such an approach will, of course, leave the United States no choice but to suddenly and directly confront China at some critical point in the future.** America's adherence to its founding principles of free navigation and free trade, not to mention its belief in a free sea, will not allow it to tolerate a Chinese assertion of sovereignty over such a large swath of heretofore-open water. Perhaps when the time comes the United States could simply land an international force of marines on one of the artificial islands as part of an amphibious exercise. As the islands are not Chinese sovereign territory, there is no reason not to use them as the staging ground for an international exercise. And such an exercise would force China's hand, making it choose between resisting the assembled international marines with armed force or acknowledging the illegitimacy of its own claims While some might view such American action as too confrontational, it was made necessary by the Obama administration's failure to nip China's ambitions in the bud. **America will now have to skip a phase, taking strong and abrupt action to reset the status quo.** As things stand, should China suddenly move to militarize the Scarborough Shoals just off of the Philippines, it is unclear if the United States would defend its ally, in keeping with its treaty commitments, or simply dispatch Secretary of State John Kerry to insist on one thing while his bosses' actions demonstrate the opposite. Such continuous, systematic acts of accommodation as have been demonstrated with Iran, Syria, and Russia invite conflict and ultimately lead to large-scale major war. Maintenance of a strong military and the upholding of our founding core principles remain the surest guarantee of peace.

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Internal Link

Absent increased American naval intervention, island building leads to an escalatory regional war which draws in the US

Klein, 2012 "Former US Diplomat: The Next Battlefield Will Be The South China Sea", Business Insider magazine, Brian Klein is an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, ex-US diplomat to China and India, writer and global strategist focusing on macroeconomic, geopolitical, and security issues, <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-south-china-sea-sparks-arms-race-2012-8>, Accessed: 7/8/14, NC)

An increasingly militarized land and sea grab continues despite calls for peaceful resolution. With the U.S. in full Asian tilt, **the South China Sea dispute is shaping up to be the first major test of its Pacific re-engagement.** What the U.S. Can or should do remains woefully undefined. There is no longer any question that as the power vacuum expands, force, not the power of the pen defines boundaries. Beijing increasingly asserts its claims within a map of its own making while a troubling and influential undercurrent gathers momentum. China now claims the entire South China Sea, brushing the shores of its neighbors and flying in the face of international norms. Call it the conventional "first-strike" option supported by influential Chinese think tanks and the popular state-controlled press—quick and decisive military engagement to convince Vietnam and the Philippines to back down. It worked in China's favor during a 1974 stand-off over the Paracel Islands. Enter the U.S., seen by many as a natural hedge against excessive Chinese influence. The State Department issued a lukewarm statement on the South China Sea urging all parties to find a peaceful solution to the impasse. Senator McCain called China's moves "provocative." Beyond routine drills and port calls with the Philippines, Vietnam and India the U.S. has taken a decidedly cautious approach. Peaceful resolution of territorial claims and a unified Southeast Asian response, not a military confrontation with China, remains a core U.S. foreign policy objective. That may be increasingly difficult to achieve as China presses its claims, recently "escorting" an Indian naval flotilla from its port call with Vietnam and hailing it with "welcome to Chinese waters." In June Philippine President Aquino sought reassurance that U.S. defense obligations would kick-in should they be attacked. The U.S. refused to take sides in the territorial dispute, a long standing policy, but reaffirmed its commitment to the bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty. At a minimum this entails immediate consultations should hostilities break out. It does not, however mean automatic military action. Even interest from the rest of Southeast Asia for greater U.S. engagement remains tentative. Vietnam continues joint exercises with China, keen to maintain balance with its main trading partner to the north. Non-claimant states including Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos have shown no interest in "taking sides", though U.S. engagement is certainly welcome. For its part China has been quick to use trade retaliation including a sudden technical hold on Philippine fruit imports. If history is any guide the unintended consequences of even a limited military skirmish may prove hard to control. The situation remains even more volatile with a leadership transition underway in Beijing as nationalistic and even jingoistic tendencies rise throughout the country. Appeasement also has its discontents. This is the fine line the U.S. must tread. There are no signs that the cycle of provocation and push-back will end any time soon. It should be no surprise if boat ramming incidents between fishing vessels and cutters eventually turn more confrontational. Perhaps **the greatest U.S. influence will be containing any escalation by its presence alone, helping to thwart the notion that China can launch a limited attack on its neighbors without consequences.** Despite China's preference the U.S. can and will remain a Pacific power, guarantor of the common interest, strengthening cooperation among parties, and routinely testing free access to international waters.

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Impact

Asian instability leads to nuclear war – many scenarios

Walter Russell Mead 11-9 2014, “Obama in Asia”, The American Interest, Walter Russell Mead is Professor of Foreign Affairs and the Humanities at Bard College, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/>

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation. East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here. American objectives in this region are clear. While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, Kaiser Wilhelm-like dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China. We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free. Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia's; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure. Asia's failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world's two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia. The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there. The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well. This is where the world's fastest growing economies are. It is where the worst environmental problems exist. It is the home of the world's largest democracy, the world's most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world's most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well. Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world's most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores. East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America's vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved. The world's most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam. From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world's most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns. That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama's trip is intended to address.

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Solvency

US military key to stopping Chinese coercion

Zack **Cooper**, MARCH 2, **2015**, CHINA'S MENACING SANDCASTLES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, War on the Rocks, Zack Cooper is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, warontherocks.com/2015/03/chinas-menacing-sandcastles-in-the-south-china-sea/8/

If U.S. leaders are serious about countering Chinese coercion, they will have to accept more risk. For too long, Beijing has set the terms of the gray zone competition by leveraging its strengths against its neighbors' weaknesses. Yet, despite its recent successes, China itself has many gray zone vulnerabilities. Through careful management of vertical and horizontal escalation risks, the United States can exploit these asymmetries to deter further Chinese coercion. Raising escalation risks can be an effective deterrent if carefully designed and calibrated. U.S. policymakers should focus their counter-coercion efforts on domains in which the United States and its allies and partners hold relative advantages, whether political, military, legal, economic, financial, or diplomatic. For example, despite China's rapid military modernization, the U.S. military retains an asymmetric advantage in maritime power projection capabilities. China has attempted to sideline U.S. naval forces by utilizing China's robust paramilitary forces to paint involvement of U.S. gray-hulled vessels as unnecessary escalation. But **in the face of mounting Chinese coercion, the United States should** consider the **use of gray hulls in gray zones.** China's coercion campaign is unlikely to end without external intervention. Allowing Beijing to dictate the terms of the competition in the East and South China Seas enables continued coercion and undermines regional and international order. **The time has come for the United States to stop playing along.**

Hegemony Advantage - SCS

Solvency

Greater US presence key to prevent instability in Asia

Ben **Rimland**, May 03, **2016**, The US Should Admit Its Vulnerability to Chinese Nuclear Attacks, The Diplomat, Ben Rimland is an MPhil student in the Modern Japanese Studies department at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, where he studies maritime security and East Asia defense issues, thediplomat.com/2016/05/the-us-should-admit-its-vulnerability-to-chinese-nuclear-attacks/

In the late 1980s, a strong American conventional presence in Europe, together with shrewd diplomatic maneuvering, led to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, removing an entire class of nuclear weapons from the battlespace. The political good will and reduced tensions from these nuclear negotiations led, in turn, to the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, largely spelling an end to the military tensions that defined the Cold War. A robust conventional presence in East Asia, combined with a more realistic American deterrence strategy, may present the best combination of sticks and carrots to induce greater Chinese cooperation in the rules-based order. Such an outcome would undoubtedly be beneficial to all involved, secure America's continued place as the undisputed military hegemon in East Asia, and **ensure China's rise does not contribute to greater global instability.**

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Uniqueness Answers

Non-Unique: China already on road to collapse – 5 reasons

David **Shambaugh**, March 6, **2015**, The Coming Chinese Crackup, The Wall Street Journal, Dr. Shambaugh is a professor of international affairs and the director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His books include “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation” and, most recently, “China Goes Global: The Partial Power”, www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198

The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed further than many think. We don’t know what the pathway from now until the end will look like, of course. It will probably be highly unstable and unsettled. But until the system begins to unravel in some obvious way, those inside of it will play along—thus contributing to the facade of stability. Communist rule in China is unlikely to end quietly. A single event is unlikely to trigger a peaceful implosion of the regime. Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that Mr. Xi will be deposed in a power struggle or coup d’état. With his aggressive anticorruption campaign—a focus of this week’s National People’s Congress—he is overplaying a weak hand and deeply aggravating key party, state, military and commercial constituencies. The Chinese have a proverb, waiying, neiruan—hard on the outside, soft on the inside. Mr. Xi is a genuinely tough ruler. He exudes conviction and personal confidence. But this hard personality belies a party and political system that is extremely fragile on the inside. Consider five telling indications of the regime’s vulnerability and the party’s systemic weaknesses. First, China’s economic elites have one foot out the door, and they are ready to flee en masse if the system really begins to crumble. In 2014, Shanghai’s Hurun Research Institute, which studies China’s wealthy, found that 64% of the “high net worth individuals” whom it polled—393 millionaires and billionaires—were either emigrating or planning to do so. Rich Chinese are sending their children to study abroad in record numbers (in itself, an indictment of the quality of the Chinese higher-education system). Just this week, the Journal reported, federal agents searched several Southern California locations that U.S. authorities allege are linked to “multimillion-dollar birth-tourism businesses that enabled thousands of Chinese women to travel here and return home with infants born as U.S. citizens.” Wealthy Chinese are also buying property abroad at record levels and prices, and they are parking their financial assets overseas, often in well-shielded tax havens and shell companies. Meanwhile, Beijing is trying to extradite back to China a large number of alleged financial fugitives living abroad. When a country’s elites—many of them party members—flee in such large numbers, it is a telling sign of lack of confidence in the regime and the country’s future. Second, since taking office in 2012, Mr. **Xi has greatly intensified** the **political repression** that has blanketed China since 2009. The targets include the press, social media, film, arts and literature, religious groups, the Internet, intellectuals, Tibetans and Uighurs, dissidents, lawyers, NGOs, university students and textbooks. The Central Committee sent a draconian order known as Document No. 9 down through the party hierarchy in 2013, ordering all units to ferret out any seeming endorsement of the West’s “universal values”—including constitutional democracy, civil society, a free press and neoliberal economics. A more secure and confident government would not institute such a severe crackdown. It is a symptom of the party leadership’s deep anxiety and insecurity. Third, even **many regime loyalists are just going through the motions**. It is hard to miss the theater of false pretense that has permeated the Chinese body politic for the past few years. Last summer, I was one of a handful of foreigners (and the only American) who attended a conference about the “China Dream,” Mr. Xi’s signature concept, at a party-affiliated think tank in Beijing. We sat through two days of mind-numbing, nonstop presentations by two dozen party scholars—but their faces were frozen, their body language was wooden, and their boredom was palpable. They feigned compliance with the party and their leader’s latest mantra. But it was evident that the propaganda had lost its power, and the emperor had no clothes. In December, I was back in Beijing for a conference at the Central Party School, the party’s highest institution of doctrinal instruction, and once again, the country’s top officials and foreign policy experts recited their stock slogans verbatim. During lunch one day, I went to the campus bookstore—always an important stop so that I can update myself on what China’s leading cadres are being taught. To my surprise, the store’s shelves ranged from Lenin’s “Selected Works” to Condoleezza Rice’s memoirs, and a table at the entrance was piled high with copies of a pamphlet by Mr. Xi on his campaign to promote the “mass line”—that is, the party’s connection to the masses. “How is this selling?” I asked the clerk. “Oh, it’s not,” she replied. “We give it away.” The size of the stack suggested it was hardly a hot item. **Fourth, the corruption that**

riddles the party-state and the military also pervades Chinese society as a whole. Mr. Xi's

anticorruption campaign is more sustained and severe than any previous one, but no campaign can eliminate the problem. It is stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client networks, an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and the absence of the rule of law.

Moreover, Mr. Xi's campaign is turning out to be at least as much a selective purge as an antigraft campaign. Many of its targets to date have been political clients and allies of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. Now 88, Mr. Jiang is still the godfather figure of Chinese politics. Going after Mr. Jiang's patronage network while he is still alive is highly risky for Mr. Xi, particularly since Mr. Xi doesn't seem to have brought along his own coterie of loyal clients to promote into positions of power. Another problem: Mr. **Xi, a child of China's first-generation**

revolutionary elites, is one of the party's "princelings," and his political ties largely extend to other

princelings. This silver-spoon generation is widely reviled in Chinese society at large. Finally, china's

economy—for all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut—is stuck in a series of systemic traps from

which there is no easy **exit.** In November 2013, Mr. **Xi** presided over the party's Third Plenum, which **unveiled a huge**

package of proposed economic reforms, but so far, **they are sputtering on the launchpad.** Yes, consumer

spending has been rising, red tape has been reduced, and some fiscal reforms have been introduced, but overall, Mr. Xi's ambitious goals have been stillborn. The reform package challenges powerful, deeply entrenched interest groups—such as state-owned enterprises and local party cadres—and they are plainly blocking its implementation.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Uniqueness Answers

Non-Unique: CCP legitimacy is on the brink and getting worse – economic slowdown & lack of reforms

Melanie **Hart**, September 29, **2015**, Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China, Center for American Progress, Melanie Hart is a Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at American Progress. She focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward China and works to identify new opportunities for bilateral cooperation, particularly on energy, climate change, and cross-border investment. Her research also covers China's political system, market regulatory reforms, and how China's domestic and foreign policy developments affect the United States., <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/>

The Chinese economy has reached an inflection point. It is not yet clear whether the Chinese Communist Party can successfully traverse these changing circumstances and maintain its hold on power. The growth model that pulled more than 400 million Chinese citizens out of poverty over the past three decades is running out of steam. Chinese wages are rising and eliminating China's prior price advantages in global export markets. Fixed infrastructure investments are producing diminishing returns. Chinese citizens no longer accept the pollution costs associated with heavy industry, and even if they did, the global market cannot continue to absorb more Chinese steel and cement at double-digit annual growth rates. In order to keep the economy growing and maintain ruling legitimacy, Chinese leaders must downshift from the old growth model and foster new industries based on technological innovation, domestic consumption, and services.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Specific Link Answers

Link Turn: Confrontation in SCS will increase nationalism and CCP legitimacy by distracting from the economic slowdown

Michael **Casey**, March 1, **2016**, Business-As-Usual Won't Suffice In The South China Sea, Forbes, Mr. Casey is a security policy studies student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs., www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/03/01/business-as-usual-wont-suffice-in-the-south-china-sea/#5e69d7c551c6

Moreover, China's economy has slowed dramatically over the past year. Official data show the economy grew at 7% in 2015 –the slowest in a quarter of a century – and the true situation may be even worse. Given that the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies upon continued economic growth, the figures are very worrisome. Engaging in overseas conflict is a useful way for government leaders to inflame nationalist fervor and channel domestic discontent towards their own purposes. Together, these two developments suggest the SAM deployment may represent a hardening of Chinese thinking on the South and East China Seas. If so, we can expect additional action, maybe the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone, over the course of this year. We should also not be surprised if China does decide to deploy anti-ship missiles or other offensive systems on the islands.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

General Link Answers

Link Turn: Competition with external powers leads to more nationalism – nationalism key to CCP legitimacy

Ryan **Hang**, OCTOBER 2014, Freedom for Authoritarianism: Patriotic Hackers and Chinese Nationalism, The Yale Review of International Studies, is a Web Developer & Software Engineer with a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Political Science (Specialization in Empirical Theory and Quantitative Methods) - his work on cyber studies and Chinese culture have been featured in several journals, yris.yira.org/essays/1447

As political circumstances in China have evolved, so has the role of nationalism in Chinese politics. The death of Mao Zedong and market oriented economic reforms championed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s fundamentally altered Chinese politics and collapsed Chinese communist ideology. Economic hardship, corruption, and political instability following Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in the 1980s "greatly weakened mass support for the CCP and eroded its basis of legitimacy."^[59] **Chinese leaders turned to nationalism** in response to the collapse of communist ideology to fill "an ideological vacuum left by the collapse of Marxist ideology and reinforce the stability of the CCP."^[60] These leaders "wrapped themselves in the mantle of pragmatic nationalism, which they found remained the most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value shared by the regime and its critics."^[61] The CCP maintained its legitimacy by promising national strength and focusing on high rates of economic growth. Through deploying nationalism, the CCP was able to ideologically tie China with itself and introduce the view that "the Communist state is the embodiment of the nation's will," and portraying the CCP as defenders of China against outside threats.^[62] **The CCP's success with deploying nationalism as a means to generate political stability has established nationalism as the basis for the support and legitimacy of the CCP.**^[63] **Nationalism is a primary strategy utilized by the Chinese government to answer political threats;** in the face of political crisis, the CCP has consistently "appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism as a way to ensure the loyalty of a population stewing in domestic discontent."^[64] Nationalism operates through a couple of mechanisms to reinforce the stability of the Chinese government. Nationalism serves the Chinese government by bolstering "its legitimacy through invoking a deep sense of "Chineseness" among its citizens.^[65] The government is able to resolve ideological fractures and consolidate the Chinese identity against external threats by fostering Nationalist sentiments. In the face of economic and political problems, nationalism "has become an effective instrument for enhancing the CCP's legitimacy by allowing for it to be defined on the claim that the regime provides political stability and economic prosperity."^[66]

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

General Link Answers

Link Turn: CCP Collapse predictions empirically false and biased

Hung et al, March 13, **2015**, When Will China's Government Collapse?, Foreign Policy, Ho-Fung Hung is an associate professor at Johns Hopkins Sociology. My scholarly interest includes global political economy, protest, nation-state formation, and social theory, with a focus on East Asia., Arthur R. Kroeber is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings-Tsinghua Center where he focuses on China's political economy and its engagement with global economic institutions, Howard Waring French is a journalist, author, and photographer, as well as an associate professor at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. He was most recently a senior foreign correspondent with The New York Times, Suisheng Zhao is a professor of Chinese politics and foreign policy at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies, foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/

Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and understanding why it works — which could create insights into why it might stop working — critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis. As a long-term resident of China, I would love the government to become more open, pluralistic and tolerant of creativity. That it refuses to do so is disappointing to me and many others, but offers no grounds for a judgment of its weakness.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage Answers - SCS

Consequentialist Impact Scenario Answers

Impact Defense and Turn: Loose nukes aren't a thing – there is no market and they are incredibly safe even when unattended. Additionally, nuclear alarmism is more likely to cause war

John **Mueller**, September 2, **2015**, The Dangers of Alarmism, John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mereson Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University. A leading expert on terrorism and particularly on the reactions (or over-reactions) it often inspires, www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dangers-alarmism

An important part of the alarmism has been directed at, and impelled by the prospect of, nuclear terrorism, the most commonly embraced method by which it has been suggested that terrorists would be able to repeat, or even top, the destruction of 9/11. It was in 2004, in his influential book, *Nuclear Terrorism* — a work Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times found to be “terrifying” — that Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. For example, in 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 89 percent over a ten-year period. Allison’s time is up, and so, pretty much, is Garwin’s. And it is important to the point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but in the words of William Langewiesche who has assessed the process in detail, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.” In fact, terrorist groups seem thus far to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists on the issue, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. It is highly improbable that a would-be atomic terrorist would be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state because the donor could not control its use and because the ultimate source of the weapon might be discovered. Although there has been great worry about terrorists illicitly stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon, it seems likely that neither “loose nukes” nor a market in illicit nuclear materials exists. Moreover, finished bombs have been outfitted with an array of locks and safety devices. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks, and could probably be followed and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. This task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence. These include the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. In addition, a host of corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable, international and local security services must be kept perpetually in the dark, and no curious outsider must get consequential wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off. In addition, the financial costs of the operation could easily become monumental. Alarmism about the atomic terrorist has had its most damaging results when it has been linked with an alarmist perspective about nuclear proliferation. For decades during and after the Cold War, there has been almost wall-to-wall alarm about the dangers supposedly inherent in nuclear proliferation. This perspective has almost never undergone careful examination. In fact, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than has been commonly predicted over the decades primarily because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor. And, more importantly, the effect of the proliferation that has taken place has been substantially benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. This holds even for the proliferation of the weapons to large, important countries run by unchallenged monsters who at the time they acquired the bombs were certifiably deranged: Josef Stalin who in 1949 was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong who in 1964 had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that had

resulted in artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished. Despite this experience, an aversion to nuclear proliferation continues to impel alarmed concern, and it was a chief motivator of the Iraq War which essentially was a militarized anti-proliferation effort in which fears that Saddam Hussein's Iraq, unlike all other nuclear states since 1945, might actually set off such weapons if he got them and/or that Saddam would give them to terrorists. The war that ensued proved to be a necessary cause of the deaths of more people than perished at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

Chinese Communist Party Stability Disadvantage - Negative

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Uniqueness

Staking legitimacy on economic growth has lead the Chinese Communist Party to the brink of collapse – they are refocusing on nationalism to compensate

Zheng **Wang**, April 29, **2014**, Tiananmen as the Turning Point: China's Impossible Balancing Act, Time Magazine, Zheng Wang is the Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies Seton Hall University and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is the author of Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, which is the winner of the International Studies Association's Yale H. Ferguson Award, time.com/73594/china-tiananmen-square-25-years-later/

Many of today's problems, such as corruption, pollution, and the development gap, can also be traced back to the government's 1989 choice. The economic reform and opening up have brought China unprecedented wealth and power. However, like the recent story of a young Chinese man who sold his kidney to purchase a new iPad, China has paid a very high price with its environment, morality, and society for its development. After 25 years of rapid growth, the new administration has noticed that it is in a difficult situation regarding new sources of economic growth. Following the significant increase of Chinese labor wages, China is losing its competitiveness as the world's factory. The rapid growth of the real estate market has significantly contributed to China's GDP growth. However, it is clearer that this path is unsustainable. It has already created a large housing bubble and become a source of social unrest. Moreover, the government has tried to separate domestic politics and foreign policy. So the CCP is embracing nationalism in its domestic politics and using nationalism and patriotic education in order to strengthen the party's legitimacy as the ruling party and to increase social cohesion. In terms of foreign relations, China has embraced globalism in the past 25 years. The government follows an open door policy, and joined the World Trade Organization. In recent years, however, we can see that this separation has created many problems. For example, the rise of nationalism has influenced China's foreign policy-making more and more. Influenced by patriotic education and nationalist narratives, the younger Chinese generations have grown more nationalistic, and they strongly criticize the government for being soft in dealing with issues, such as the South China Sea and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The government has already found itself in such a dilemma that it has very little flexibility to deal with external disputes with rising nationalism at home.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Uniqueness

Chinese Communist Party stability is on the brink of collapse – CCP distracting the public by refocusing on nationalism

Pei MinXin, November 12, **2015**, The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China, The American Interest, Pei Minxin is an expert on governance in the People's Republic of China, U.S.-Asia relations, and democratization in developing nations. He currently serves as the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/

Unfortunately for proponents of the theory of “authoritarian resilience”, their assumptions, evidence, and conclusions have become harder to defend in light of recent developments in China. Signs of intense elite power struggle, endemic corruption, loss of economic dynamism, and an assertive, high-risk foreign policy are all in evidence. As a result, even some of the scholars whose research has been associated with the authoritarian resilience thesis of have been forced to reconsider.² It has become increasingly clear that the recent developments that have changed perceptions of the CPC’s durability are not cyclical but structural. They are symptomatic of the exhaustion of the regime’s post-Tiananmen survival strategy. Several critical pillars of this strategy—such as elite unity, performance-based legitimacy, co-optation of social elites, and strategic restraint in foreign policy—have either collapsed or become hollow, forcing the CPC to resort increasingly to repression and appeals to nationalism to cling to power.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

General Links

Conflict with US leads to authoritarianism and collapse

Pei MinXin, November 12, **2015**, The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China, The American Interest, Pei Minxin is an expert on governance in the People's Republic of China, U.S.-Asia relations, and democratization in developing nations. He currently serves as the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/

Manipulating nationalism and muscle-flexing may deliver short-term political benefits, but only at the cost of the CPC's long-term security. One of the wisest strategic choices made by Deng Xiaoping was to develop friendly ties with the U.S.-led West to accelerate China's modernization program. In the post-Deng era, Xi's two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, also learned a key lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: a strategic conflict with the United States would imperil the very survival of the CPC. The costs of a new arms race would be unbearable, and outright hostility in Sino-U.S. relations would destroy the bilateral economic relationship. It is unclear whether the CPC leadership understands the risks of its new and still-evolving survival strategy. If its members are convinced that only this strategy could save CPC rule, now threatened by the collapse of the key pillars of the post-Tiananmen model, they are likely to continue on the present course. Ironically, such a course, if the above analysis is right, is more certain to accelerate the CPC's demise than to prevent it.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

General Links

Showing weakness to foreign powers undermines governmental legitimacy

Dr. Jessica **Chen-Weiss**, , March 4, **2013**, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Yale University, "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas," Testimony in a Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, p. 64.

Popular nationalism is both a liability and a potential advantage in Chinese diplomacy. Just as the President can point to Congress and say his hands are tied in diplomatic negotiations, so can Chinese leaders point to nationalist sentiment and popular protests. As Deng Xiaoping told Japanese officials in 1987, "In regard to China-Japan relations, reactions among youths, especially students, are strong. If difficult problems were to appear still further, it will become impossible to explain them to the people. It will become impossible to control them [the people]. I want you to understand this position which we are in." Two years later, the government faced its gravest crisis of legitimacy. Protests against Japan in the fall of 1985 had given way to accusations of government corruption and calls for democracy in 1986 and 1989. For the Chinese leadership, nationalism is both a vulnerability and a source of strength: **undermining the government's legitimacy if seen as weak against foreign insults and provocations,** and strengthening its legitimacy if seen as a staunch defender of the nation's interests.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

South China Sea Links

Successful SCS expansion key to CCP legitimacy

Jihyun **Kim**, Summer **2015**, Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Jihyun Kim is an assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, IL, where she teaches US-East Asian relations and problems on contemporary Asia. Dr. Kim holds a PhD in political science from the University of South Carolina, where she specialized in international relations and comparative politics. Her major research interests include regional security and major power interactions in East Asia, Chinese and Korean politics and foreign policy, and nuclear security and nonproliferation, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/Summer_2015/kim.pdf

In addition, Beijing has resorted to the promise of building a more prosperous economic future together with appeals to Chinese nationalism so as to compensate for increasingly irrelevant communist tenets and to enhance public support for the regime. Yet, this could be a dangerous mixture, given that if Chinese leaders fail to deliver the promise of economic growth, they would be under pressure to depend “even more heavily on nationalist appeals as its sole remaining source of support.”⁷ In fact, nationalism can be one of the most powerful domestic sources of territorial expansion, which could be exploited by Chinese leaders to bolster political security at home through uniting the public and diverting their frustrations outward. There are several reasons why nationalism and territory are closely intertwined and can easily provide a justification for the state to take a diversionary action through belligerent expansion.⁸ In the case of China, such incentives are particularly strong because of its historical memories of territorial loss and its aspiration to regain the status of a great power after its century of humiliation. In this light, **a key aspect of Beijing’s legitimacy stems from protecting national dignity and never again letting China to be bullied.** What is more, China’s growing social instability and public discontent, engendered by decades of rapid economic reforms at any cost, have made nationalism even more essential as a substitute for the governing ideology and as a mechanism to unify the country and sustain the legitimacy of the state. Consequently, **leaders in Beijing fear that if they show flexibility regarding China’s foreign relations, including its maritime claims in the South China Sea, it could be taken as a sign of disgraceful appeasement and weakness at home.** In this view, China’s muscle-flexing foreign policy, including its southward push into the western Pacific, can be seen as a diversionary maneuver to preserve domestic cohesion and unity as well as regime legitimacy.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Consequentialist Impact Scenario – Internal Links

CCP collapse leads to loose nukes

Ryan **Kuhns**, May 11, **2015**, The Communist Party of China and Nuclear Weapons, The Sunday Sentinel, Ryan Kuhns is a Research Associate at PAXsims (strategy simulation company) and former editor at the Patterson School of International Affairs' magazine ExPatt - his focuses are in security, strategy, defense economy, international relations, politics, and futurism, thesundaysentinel.com/communist-party-china-nuclear-weapons/#.VzD5K0wrKM9

If the CCP's long slide into the woodchip heap of irrelevance has begun, then the status of a China's nuclear arsenal, post-CCP, must be considered. There are two broad possibilities. One is that the CCP, through a peaceful transition or a tense downfall, leaves the Chinese national political stage and is replaced by singular power (maybe democratic) which inherits the CCP's monopoly on force. In this case, the status of China's nuclear weapons may not be a cause of much anxiety for the nations of the world. That possibility would make this a short blog entry. Let's consider the disintegration of the Chinese state into multiple factions (as has happened many times in China's long history), which may be at war with each other. In this scenario, the issue of "loose nukes" would be of great concern to Washington. In order to frame the magnitude of the issue, a short consideration of a situation considered more plausible by the US defense establishment and international relations scholars is necessary. North Korea and Pakistan are often considered to be the two states that are the most likely to collapse and present the international community with a high stakes game of hide and seek. The size of the Pakistani arsenal (100-120 nuclear warheads), and the close proximity of non-state groups that wish to harm the US, makes its case particularly alarming and interesting to see a US response. In Andrew F. Krepinievich's 2009 book "7 Deadly Scenarios", he considers the difficulties, for Washington and its allies, of rounding up or destroying nuclear weapons in the case of a collapse of Pakistan. Krepinievich believed, in 2009, that the US military lacks the capabilities to simultaneously snatch and grab all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of a collapse. At most, Special Operations forces may be able to carry out 3 simultaneous raids at a time, and this is only if they are deployed in Afghanistan and India with the proper transport. In order to carry out the raids, the military must first know where the nuclear weapons are. This will be the biggest obstacle to recovery and destruction operations in a fractured Pakistan. Even if the US intelligence community is able to utilize existing relationships with the ISI and Pakistani army, and form new ones on an ad hoc basis, the ability of US aircraft to carry out strikes on hardened weapons locations will be hampered by a lack of ordinance (outside of nuclear tipped varieties) able to eliminate all positions. Krepinievich also estimates that stability operations in Pakistan would require "three to four times the size" of the peak US forces deployed to Afghanistan and Pakistan and "some \$200 to \$400 billion" dollars a year, based on calculations related to the costs of propping up Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, take these issues and apply them to similar operations in a destabilized China. The US would be contending with a modernized military as a significant barrier to its access to secure nuclear weapons. Although, this problem could vary in its intensity based on the coherence of a post-CCP People's Liberation Army (PLA). Add in the complex (and not fully cooperative) relationship between the PLA and US military. Then, consider the size of China itself, which has 9,326,410 sq km of land to Pakistan's 770,875 sq km. Even removing the swathes of land that would be unable to host nuclear forces (mobile or otherwise), the level of accurate intelligence required to comb 9.3 million sq km of land for around 250 nuclear warheads is intimidating. Even in the event of perfect intelligence, the ability to deploy Special Operation Forces and Aircraft would be heavily affected by the ability of the US military to move those forces into positions were they could do their jobs. This would be undoubtedly complicated by the nature of the US deployments in the region at the time of a collapse. If the event was sudden and unexpected, this would significantly magnify the issue.

CCP Collapse Disadvantage

Consequentialist Impact Scenario – Impact

Loose nukes are the largest security threat – just one attack tanks the economy and causes hundreds of thousands of deaths

Greg **Terry**n, October 23, **2015**, Hillary Was Right: Rogue Nukes Are a Serious Threat, The National Interest, Greg Terry is a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, nationalinterest.org/feature/hillary-was-right-rogue-nukes-are-serious-threat-14152

What is the greatest threat to national security? According to Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton in the first Democratic debate of the 2016 election season, it is the threat of nuclear weapons and material falling into the wrong hands. Former President George W. Bush said the same thing in a previous presidential debate. No matter your opinion of their politics, they are right. Both terrorists and smugglers have expressed interest in such a transfer, and we should consider ourselves lucky that one has yet to occur. How might a terrorist acquire a nuclear bomb or enough nuclear material to create a crude weapon? The most likely scenario involves a terrorist group purchasing or stealing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and developing an improvised nuclear device. With just 25 kilograms of HEU, which could easily fit in a shoebox or backpack, terrorists could make a nuclear weapon capable of inflicting the same devastation as the bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With less nuclear material, terrorists could lace conventional explosives with radiological material to create a dirty bomb that would disperse radiological material upon detonation. The results would be devastating: in addition to casualties from the explosion, concerns of radiological fallout would create panic and economic disruption.

South China Sea Negative

Inherency Answers - SCS

US already doing a lot in South China Sea

Eric **Gomez**, APRIL 12, **2016**, Calls to “Do More” in the South China Sea Miss Bigger Questions, Cato Institute, Eric Gomez is a Research Associate for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. His academic and professional research focuses on regional security issues and U.S military strategy in East Asia, with a focus on maritime territorial disputes and China’s military modernization, www.cato.org/blog/calls-do-more-south-china-sea-miss-bigger-questions

It is difficult to determine what exactly “more” means given the already high level of U.S. activity in the SCS since the USS Lassen conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in late October 2015. Since then, the U.S. Navy has conducted another FONOP in addition to other patrols involving aircraft carrier strike groups. Additionally, Philippine-U.S. military cooperation has reached its highest point since American forces were ejected from the country in 1991. Notable examples of cooperation are the recently finalized agreement for the U.S. military to set up “permanent logistics facilities” at five Filipino air bases, and tens of millions of dollars in military aid to improve the Philippines’ maritime patrol and surveillance capabilities.

Inherency Answers - SCS

The US is already increasing deployment in the South China Sea

Ely **Ratner**, MARCH 2, **2015**, CHINA'S MENACING SANDCASTLES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, War on the Rocks, Ely Ratner is a senior fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, warontherocks.com/2015/03/chinas-menacing-sandcastles-in-the-south-china-sea/8/

Efforts by the Obama administration to enhance America's strategic position in Southeast Asia have been considerable: expanding and diversifying U.S. force posture, strengthening our alliances, building partner capacity, engaging regional institutions and providing forward-deployed U.S. forces with the newest and most advanced capabilities. Accompanying this has been intensive diplomacy in the region, including with China. And yet none of this has been sufficient to stop or deter China from proceeding apace with its land reclamation activities.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Uniqueness Answers

Non-Unique: US is in charge and will continue to be

Salvatore **Babones** June 11, **2015**. American Hegemony Is Here to Stay, The National Interest, Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089

When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, American hegemony was complete. The United States sat at the top of the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This “unipolar moment” lasted a mere decade. September 11, 2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of China and reemergence of Russia put an end to the era of unchallenged American leadership. Now, America’s internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, American hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated. America’s costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world’s seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Uniqueness Answers

Non-Unique: China can't, and doesn't want to, run Asia

Dingding **Chen**, January 14, **2015**, Relax, China Won't Challenge US Hegemony, The Diplomat, Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of 海国图智研究院 (Intellisla Institute), a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights, thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-china-wont-challenge-us-hegemony/

First let us look at China's capabilities, which need to be especially formidable if China wants to challenge the United States.

Although China's comprehensive capabilities have been growing rapidly for the past three decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is still a huge gap between China and the U.S. in terms of comprehensive capabilities, particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and technological realms. China's economy might have already passed the U.S. economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of China's economy still remains a major weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day China's comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it would still be a huge mistake for China to challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely interconnected, creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries. Besides limited capabilities, China also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts. It is true that China's grand strategy is to realize the "China dream" — a dream that will bring wealth, glory, and power to China again — but this, by no means, suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia, or to create a Sino-centric tributary system around which all smaller states must obey China's orders. Perhaps these perceptions exist in the United States because many U.S. analysts have unconsciously let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power and influence. But the structure of international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony ineffective or even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony outweigh the benefits of hegemony in this new era of international politics, thanks to rising nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers. The Chinese leaders understand this new and changed structure of international politics and based on their assessments, they have decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new era.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Internal Link Answers

Turn: Attempting to maintain US hegemony leads to instability

Christopher **Layne, 2012** (International Studies Quarterly 56, "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana")

Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington "to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing's acceptance and accommodation of Washington's core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia" (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what's in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino- American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: "This town ain't big enough for both of us") or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons can- not occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China's ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Internal Link Answers

Turn: Chinese hegemony is key to Asian stability

Parag **Khanna**, Winter **2008**, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, Parag Khanna is an international relations expert and best-selling author. He is a CNN Global Contributor and Senior Research Fellow in the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is also the Managing Partner of Hybrid Reality, a geostrategic advisory firm, and Co-Founder & CEO of Factotum, a boutique content strategy agency, [https://books.google.com/books?id=jVsBYQe7GnYC&pg=PA258&lpg=PA258&dq="chinese+hegemony"+"asian+stability"&source=bl&ots=9CGsjA7Fju&sig=w4v76wV4wKgYfPMImMHuUG0D5Wc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiTk-uGx4_NAhUSSIIKHbgADrgQ6AEIPDAF#v=onepage&q=%22chinese%20hegemony%22%20%22asian%20stability%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=jVsBYQe7GnYC&pg=PA258&lpg=PA258&dq=)

"It's not just on our maps. It's in our minds: China is the center of all the action here," explained a Singaporean journalist, pointing to the growing Chinese staff in his office. China sits at the core of the most populous and economically dynamic pan-region in the world, encompassing Russia's Far East, Japan, the Korean peninsula, India, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands, including Australia and New Zealand. No nation within the India-Japan-Australia triangle - whether of the first, second, or third world - can withstand China's economic, demographic, political, and cultural encroachment. Some Americans believe it is their own preponderance that guarantees Asian stability, but the half of the world population that resides in Asia increasingly sees its stability as occurring under Chinese hegemony. "America can come and go, but our fate ultimately hinges on China's decisions and behavior," remarked a Thai diplomat during a conference at a five-star Bangkok hotel.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Impact Answers

No miscalculation escalation in Asia – precedent for restraint

Steven **Stashwick**, September 25, **2015**, South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and 'Miscalculation' Myths, The Diplomat, Steven Stashwick has a graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago, and is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/>

In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere 'incident' of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea's armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea's political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility. On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint. For a front so often considered a "flashpoint," it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military "white hull" vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation. And while "gray hull" naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Solvency Answers

Turn: US military action in South China Sea leads to Chinese backlash

Doug **Bandow** and Eric **Gomez**, October 22, **2015**, Further Militarizing the South China Sea May Undermine Freedom of Navigation, CATO Institute, Doug Bandow is Senior Fellow and Eric Gomez is Research Associate at the Cato Institute, www.cato.org/publications/commentary/further-militarizing-south-china-sea-may-undermine-freedom-navigation

A FONOP also is likely to spark a Chinese backlash, hindering a peaceful resolution of SCS disputes. As MIT's Taylor Fravel observed, a FONOP "gives China an opportunity to assert that the United States is the country 'militarizing' the South China Sea," providing Beijing with an excuse to respond in kind. It would be better to instead test Chinese pledges of goodwill. Xi Jinping's recent promise not to militarize the artificial islands may be insincere, but conducting a FONOP will create pressure for Xi to respond aggressively, even if his commitment to eschew militarization was genuine. Likewise, China would appear aggressive, dangerous, and duplicitous if it continued to take provocative actions after promising to not militarize, making an American response appear reasonable. Additionally, a FONOP plays into Chinese nationalist rhetoric that paints American actions as hypocritical and one-sided. What about America's allies and friends? Reassuring Washington's partners appears to be the true objective of the upcoming FONOP. To make up for their limited military capabilities, other claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines have turned to the United States. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has repeatedly proclaimed that American participation in the SCS dispute is intended to reassure allies that Washington will not leave them flapping in the wind. For instance, at the Shangri La Dialogue, Carter declared, "There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows." A FONOP in the SCS would back his rhetoric. However, if China uses the U.S. action as a rationale for maintaining or increasing the rate of island reclamation then friendly states likely would feel even more threatened. This would counteract the FONOP's original purpose and would likely push the United States and China into a dangerous spiral, requiring more shows of force to reassure allies against an assertive China acting aggressively in response to American shows of force. Chinese behavior in the SCS is a legitimate concern for the United States, but Washington should realize that this dispute is unlikely to be resolved with military power. Indeed, problems will only grow if both Washington and Beijing keep poking each other in the eye. Maintaining peace in the SCS instead requires the United States and China to work together to resolve precisely these kinds of contentious issues.

Hegemony Advantage Answers - SCS

Solvency Answers

Turn: South China Sea engagement leads to US hegemony decline and Chinese hegemony increase

Philip **Reynolds** June 01, **2016**, Is China Winning in the South China Sea?, The Diplomat, Phil Reynolds is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Hawaii, thediplomat.com/2016/06/is-china-winning-in-the-south-china-sea/

China is using the South China Sea islands as the means of making the 21st century for itself what the 20th century was to the United States. Chinese policies, coldly rational, are meant to illicit a military response from the United States. As the dominant power, Washington has little incentive to give the challenger a stage on which it can engage the United States as a peer. On the other hand, China has everything to gain from a successful challenge. This leads to an interesting hypothesis: The islands themselves are really not the objective of Chinese expansion. Rather, the goal of China's grand strategy may be to successfully challenge the United States in the eyes of the world. If China is correct, any actual conflict with the United States will not end in an all-out war. Intense pressure from the international community will quickly lead to a negotiated settlement. This is a win for China, one that it is preparing for in its new Defense White Paper, just released in mid-2015. China has been preparing its maritime forces for "offshore waters defense" and to "protect its maritime rights and interests." China's ability to deny the United States entry into contested areas is meant to last just long enough for negotiations to begin. Faced with the loss of ships and sailors, it will be difficult to convince the American public that Chinese hegemony in the western Pacific is an existential threat, especially after the debacle in Iraq. History and China have maneuvered the United States into a bleak position with four alternatives, all of which benefit China: The United States can continue with low-grade military confrontations that do little to stop Chinese expansion; the United States can go to war and quickly find itself with heavy losses and a negotiated settlement; it can retreat, leaving its recent partner nations to develop their own status quo with China; or it can move away from the "pivot to Asia" toward a more realpolitik approach vis-a-vis China. A fifth outcome, worst of all, is that newly emboldened partners push back against the Chinese, triggering a shooting war and drawing in the United States. All five outcomes make China look stronger and closer to making the 21st century a Chinese century.